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Fisheries often fall prey to overfishing and the exhaustion of stock. Fishing
governance is an ongoing attempt to prevent such an outcome. Over time, fisheries
regulation has generally moved from controls on inputs to controls on output, such
as catch limits and Individual Transferable Quotas. Individual Transferable Quotas
have reduced overcapitalization, and have in some cases allowed stocks to rebuild.
However, because they enable market trading of catch shares which tends to
concentrate fisheries in fewer hands.
This paper proposes applying a duty of stewardship to the existing fisheries
governance structure. “Stewardship” is an obligation to be responsible for taking care
of another person’s property. The concept of stewardship easily applies to fisheries,
because fisheries are natural resources which belong to the public. Current regimes,
such as Individual Transferable Quotas (“ITQs”) do not do enough to prevent the
employment of destructive fishing practices and place the burden of natural
resource management on the government. Assigning a duty of stewardship upon
fishers, whether they own or lease an ITQ, would require fishers to be stewards of
common resources and use responsible fishing practices.
Keywords: Individual transferable quotas (ITQs); Duty of stewardship; Fisheries;
Management schemesIntroduction
The tragedy of the commons is a well-known phenomenon that describes what can
happen if there are no controls on the use of a shared resource and too many users
willing to deplete that resource (Hardin 1968). Fisheries often fall prey to the tra-
gedy of the commons, and fishing regulation can be regarded as the ongoing
attempt to prevent this outcome (Macinko and Schumann 2008). A variety of
methods have been employed to manage fisheries, from input controls such as des-
ignated season lengths and types of gear that can be used to output controls such
as catch limits. (Macinko and Schumann 2008). Many countries have implemented
Individual Transferable Quotas, a form of property right that can be transferred.
While ITQs have reduced overcapitalization of fish stocks, they have also enabled
market trading which concentrates fisheries in fewer hands (Ecotrust Canada 2009;
Bromley and Macinko 2007).
This paper proposes applying the duty of stewardship to all fishers. ITQs have
reduced overfishing, but have insufficiently protected fisheries from destructive fishing2014 Soliman; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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less reason to think beyond the profits garnered today. As it stands today, the regulator
alone is accountable for protecting the resource. Therefore, it has become necessary to
legally require that fishers be responsible for protecting the health and productivity of
the resource from which they extract. If the immediate benefits of employing certain
types of fishing techniques outweigh the negatives of using other practices which are
better for the long-term, then fishers have no incentive to be stewards of the fisheries.
Consequently, the duty of stewardship must be applied to fishers via individual fishing
contracts and/or government regulation that can be applied to any fisher.Fisheries regulation: concepts and history
The tragedy of the commons theory suggests that multiple individuals, acting inde-
pendently and rationally on behalf of their own self-interest, will ultimately deplete a
shared limited resource if there are no individual property rights. According to the the-
ory, this will happen even though each individual knows that depletion of the resource
is not in their own interest, nor in anyone’s long-term interest (Hardin 1968).
Private property rights are one way to effectuate sustainable stewardship of shared re-
sources. Farmers are incentivized to conserve land when given permanent and exclusive
ownership of that area (Leal 2000). When the owner can reap the benefits as well as suf-
fer the consequences for misuse of property the owner is incentivized to consider the
long-term consequences of mis-management land use. As Ziff puts it: “Private property
can operate to reduce the ability of an owner to shunt off costs onto others. In the lan-
guage of economics, private ownership can reduce social costs or ‘negative externalities’”
(Ziff 1996). While private property incentivizes more sustainable stewardship of com-
mon resources, private ownership does not guarantee conservation of resources. If the
value of short-term exploitation outweights the value of long-term conservation, then
economic theory suggests that private owners have no incentive to act in such a way to
protects the future availability of that resource. In fact, most private owners prefer
profits now over profits later (Macinko and Bromley 2004). Bromley, presents several
examples of laws that have been promulgated in order to legally require that property
owners take care of their property, and argues that these laws would not need to exist if
ownership was a sufficient incentive to maintain that property in good order. He con-
cludes: “To be precise about the matter, if the ‘time preference’ of a private owner is
such that income now trumps income in the future, then private owners will be quite in-
tent on liquidating (destroying) a renewable natural resource in order to spend the pro-
ceeds—or invest them elsewhere” (Bromley 2009). Consequently, private property rights
are not always sufficient to prevent the destruction of a shared resource.
Private ownership is only one solution to natural resource protection. Regulations
which focus on the harm can also serve to preserve shared resources. As Ziff points
out, “the tragedy of the commons story is not so much an argument in favour of pri-
vate property as it is a manifestation of the perils of unregulated common property”
(Ziff 1996). Many researchers do not believe that the solution lies in property laws.
Driesen, for example, advocates for a solution that focuses “upon the harms” and not
on ownership (Driesen 2002). For example, pastures in the Swiss Alps have successfully
been managed as common property for centuries without suffering from overgrazing.
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which places limitations specifically on the permit holder. In summary: private property
rights are but one one possible way of preventing the tragedy of the commons.
Researchers hold widely varying views about the relative effectiveness of the various
possible solutions. What is not in doubt is that when there is completely unregulated,
open access to a limited shared resource, then that resource is very likely to be depleted
and destroyed (de Schutter 2011). Without regulation, natural resources like fisheries
are likely to be depleted.
Tragedy of the commons in fisheries
The characteristics of shared fish stocks make them vulnerable to the tragedy of the
commons. In the absence of regulation, each fisher owns only the fish he can catch
(Churchill and Lowe 1999). Under English common law, this is known as the rule of
capture (Scott 2000). Given that most fish stocks do not stay in one place, a fish
which is not caught today may not be available to fish tomorrow. This promotes the
immediate depletion of the fisheries in order to take advantage of their benefits
today (Churchill and Lowe 1999). Eggert and Ulmestrand (2007) describe the
situation as follows:
The problems related to open access marine fisheries lead fishermen to lack in
responsibilities for future benefit flows. In fact, theoretically, open-access fishery
implies that fishermen only care about their own catch today, but completely
disregard their potential catch tomorrow and in the more distant future (Clark 1973).
It is sometimes held that wealth or the prospect of wealth leads to over exploitation
of resources and that myopic behaviour of fishermen is a result of the human nature
(Ludwig et al. 1993). However, from an economics perspective, the problem is rather
that poorly defined property rights lead to perverse economic incentives, which causes
excessive effort and shortsightedness (Björndal and Munro, 1999).
Ownership alone is insufficient to prevent the irresponsible depletion of shared re-
sources. Ostrom finds that the tragedy of the commons applies to fisheries with only
one significant difference: the basis for ownership is capture rather than long-term pos-
session. Coastal waters are ripe for overfishing, but regulatory controls and enforce-
ment of such controls can protect fisheries.
Fisheries regulation through input controls
Among the first effort to preserve fisheries was the introduction of licences (Squires
1995). Rather than having open access to fisheries, fishers now had to have licenses
which granted them the right to fish. Only a limited number of licenses were available
to be given out. As fishing technology has improved, fishers have been able to vastly in-
crease their catch. This meant that the total fishing capacity of the fleet came to easily
surpass the sustainable yield. In response to overfishing, governments applied strict
conditions on licences, but problems persisted (National Research Council 1999). In
some instances, fishing was limited to a certain number of days per year. In other in-
stances, licenses limited the size of the vessels that could be used. Unfortunately these
limitations had little effect – fishers quickly developed more efficient ways to fish the
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up for the size of their boat. Without protections, fishers had no incentive to fish
sustainably because if they did not catch the fish today, their competitor would catch
that fish.
To combat overfishing, governments restricted fishing by setting limits on the quan-
tity of fish stocks that could be fished by license holders (Kerr et al. 2003). Thus, the
regulatory approach shifted from a system by which who could fish and what could be
used to fish was controlled (i.e. input control) to a system where catch limits were
imposed (i.e. output control). Many output control regimes use a type of limited prop-
erty right called an Individual Transferable Quota (“ITQ”). In an ITQ regime, the
government sets a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for a region and/or a fish species, and
grants fishers shares of the TAC, what is known as an ITQ. ITQs are transferable –
they can be leased and sold. Transferability is permitted becauseit is expected that this
will lead to “efficiency”; the fishermen with the lowest costs will be able to place the
highest bids for the ITQs (FAO 2004). Herein lies the problem – the license holders
no longer have any more than a financial stake in the health and viability of the
fishery.
ITQs have reduced overfishing and helped to preserve fish stocks. The most import-
ant impact of ITQs has been to put a stop to the “race to fish.” Some fisheries utilize
the TACs, but do not assign individual quotas. This means that each season a TAC is
set and once that TAC has been met in the aggregate the fishing season is closed. This
system incentivizes individual fisheries to use whatever techniques to capture as many
fish as quickly as possible. There are no consequences for using techniques that are
harmful to the health of the fishery (such as techniques that capture significant
amounts of bycatch in addition to the desired catch). Thus, behaviors dedicated to
simply maximizing profits do not guarantee the most rational behavior nor the most
productive, sustainable approach. Market based principles such as profit maximization
do not actually guarantee that industries will act in their best interests.
While ITQ regulations have succeeded in conserving the particular fish stock man-
aged by the ITQ regime, there is no certainty that ITQs alone can protect the future
viability of the fishery (Chu 2008). If the TAC for a fishery is set too high, ITQs may
succeed in limiting the catch to that amount, but too many fish will be caught and the
resource will eventually be exhausted. Therefore, ITQs make little difference unless the
TAC is set at the appropriate level. But even if the TAC has been properly set, exhaus-
tion can be economically rational under a property rights regime if the benefits of fish-
ing today outweigh the benefits of leaving fish for tomorrow (i.e. the discount rate).
Sumaila modeled Canada’s Atlantic cod fishery off Newfoundland, and found that a
discount rate of 20% resulted in a predicted collapse that closely paralleled the actual
collapse that occurred after ITQs were introduced to that fishery (Sumaila 2010).
ITQs have been criticized for a number of reasons. First, ITQ regimes have enabled
fishers with licenses to reap significant profits, but have not set aside any money for
the public or for the protection of the natural resource (Bromley 2009). As a public
resource, it seems reasonable that the public should be compensated for the yearly
depletion of the fish, even if it is sustainably depleted. Also, it would seem that license-
holders should be responsible for contributing to efforts to maintain the health and
viability of fish and their habitat. Second, ITQregimes typically concentrate ownership
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and Charles 2004). This often results in job losses and can be associated with the
disappearance of small fishers who cannot compete with the larger companies. The
hardest hit by the concentration of licenses in large fishing operations are the coastal
communities and small-scale fisheries who depend on the fish for a livelihood and food
(Davis 1996). As a result, ITQs have often faced intense opposition from small-scale
and traditional fishers (Macinko 2007). Researchers are concerned about the conse-
quences of utilizing ITQs in Third World nations, where traditional fisheries are seen
as necessary for the survival of millions of low-income people (Kurien 2004). Even in
wealthier nations, there are fears about the long-term impacts on ecosystems and
communities that may result if economic efficiency is allowed to be the sole deter-
minant of fisheries policy. Consequently, many are seeking alternative policy strategies
that could achieve some of the benefits of ITQs while avoiding their worst negative
impacts.An alternative: the duty of stewardship in fisheries
This paper proposes defining the legal duty of stewardship to fisheries and marine eco-
systems and applying this duty of stewardship to the existing fisheries governance
structure.
What is a duty of stewardship? Black’s Law Dictionary defines a steward as “a person
appointed to manage the affairs of another” (Garner 2009). Thus, the person who owns
a valuable item outright generally has no duty of stewardship with respect to that item.
There is nolegal obligation to take care of the item owned, though there may be obliga-
tions to take care that your ownership does not affect other privately owned items.
Duties of stewardship, either implicit or explicit, abound in our everyday lives.
Land is one privately owned “item” where many researchers have discussed the appli-
cation of the duty of stewardship. Legal experts, such as Hamilton (1998) and Karp
(1993), have argued that landowners should be subject to a duty of stewardship with re-
spect to their land, even if they own it in fee simple. Under traditional concepts of land
ownership, a landowner has complete freedom to use their land as they wish. This view
is contrary to traditional concepts of ownership, which are founded on the idea that a
landowner has nearly complete freedom to do as he likes with his land. This traditional
view, however, is severely weakened by the fact that what an owner does with his land
can have significant impacts on other people, across space and time. According to Karp
(1993), “[l]and is fundamentally different from other forms of property. Because any
parcel of land is part of a network of natural systems extending beyond the boundaries
described in the deed, it attains an importance superior to any individual landowner
or to any period in time. Land is essential to our right of survival”. In a few jurisdic-
tions, notably Iowa, this concept has been recognized and validated in common law,
thus restricting the freedom of landowners to some degree (Hamilton 2011).
The concepts of stewardship and “land ethic” are highly controversial in the agricul-
tural realm because these concepts appear to infringe on the presumption that the
owner of real property should be free to do with their property as they wish. Legally
speaking, fisheries are different from farms. While land owners own the land, fishers
own neither the uncaught fish, nor the water in which the fish swim. Uncaught fish
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the concept of a duty of stewardship – a responsibility to take care of the property of
others – is compatible with the legal nature of a fishery. Because fishers are not owners,
fishers must be explicitly subject to a duty of stewardship in order to be held legally ac-
countable for fishing responsible.
Most proponents of ownership-based schemes such as ITQs argue that ownership it-
self promotes the conservation and protection of marine resources similarly to some-
one subject to a duty of stewardship. ITQ supporters believe that proper stewardship
behavior results from a properly designed and implemented ITQ regime (Bromley
2009). Macinko and Whitmore dismiss this claim, and state: “The simple truth is that
ownership does not ensure stewardship or conservation. We know … that both private
and public owners may either care for natural resources or abuse them” (Macinko and
Whitmore 2009).
While ownership may or may not improve the odds that an individual will be a good
steward of natural resources, another important question remains. Will the future
stream of benefits derived from being a good steward exceed the current benefits of
natural resource overexploitation? Or in other words, what is a fisher’s incentive to be
a steward? It is rational to expect an owner to exploit natural resources if the benefits
of taking natural resources today is greater than the benefits of ensuring their future
existence. Much of this depends on the actions of other fishers who are at the same
time weighing the same concerns. The fear is that another fisher will get what you did
not catch, but have the capacity to catch. Therefore, without legislated or contractually
set limitations on how and what a fisher can catch, the tragedy of the commons
persists.
Poaching and illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing (IUU) alters the benefits that
fishers can expect in the future. If fishers believe that other fishers can cheat and in-
crease their returns, the future benefit stream will be seen as risky. Effective and cred-
ible enforcement will reduce the risk of being a good steward and balance current and
future benefits. Therefore, proper enforcement is an integral part to the solution. Inher-
ently this means that the management scheme would not in fact be voluntary. For fisher-
ies, stewardship does not automatically flow from ownership. Consequently a duty of
stewardship needs to be explicitly created and imposed (Macinko 2007). It is dangerous to
assume that adequate stewardship will result simply from assigning ownership rights.
According to Macinko stewardship should be the goal itself, a mechanism for achiev-
ing conservation. He describes stewardship as “an ethic, an attitude, a responsibility”
(Macinko 2007). For Macinko, the term “stewardship” represents the legal and oper-
ational mechanism that this paper calls a “duty of stewardship”, and the underlying
meta-governance principles and ethics that justify creating this mechanism.
Ownership of property is tied to certain property laws, depending on the type
of ownership. Without a legislated or contractual duty, the duty of stewardship is
to be understood as a duty under tort law. The idea is that the duty of steward-
ship is applicable regardless of the category of property rights at play or it can be
utilized in association with management measures that do not involve property
rights. The duty of stewardship is intended to supplemental existing fisheries
management methods because the current schemes are incomplete. It is not a
standalone duty.
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The application of a duty of stewardship is further justified by meta-principles or the
underlying principles and assumptions of fisheries governance (Kooiman et al. 2008).
As Kooiman et al. (2005) says, “[w]hen governors define the problems they think
should be addressed and the solutions to these problems, they inevitably draw on fun-
damental assumptions and worldviews that should be brought to the surface so they
can be explained, defended and examined”. Kooiman proposed a list of twelve ethics
and principles for the meta-governance of fisheries (Kooiman et al. 2005). These princi-
ples justify the application of a duty of stewardship to fisheries governance. According
to the meta-principles, the preservation of species and ecosystems is morally good. A
duty of stewardship promotes environmental ethics by requiring fishers to preserve the
marine environment on which they depend.
The duty of stewardship has been linked to the “land ethic” and sheds light on the
application of the duty upon actors within fisheries. Hamilton (2010) wrote:
[I]n many ways Leopold's views provided a theoretical underpinning for the modern
ecology movement, which attempts to alter how man relates to the environment and
to assign the costs of environmental degradation to those responsible… Even if the
United States experiences difficulty developing a true Leopoldian land ethic, it does
not mean society is without methods to address agriculture's impact on the
environment. In an increasingly legalized society we have come to rely on laws and
legal duties as a substitute for a land ethic. Laws which impose a duty on landowners
to protect their soil from erosion, such as one enacted in Iowa in 1971, and new
laws requiring farmers to account for their impact on the environment have the
effect of changing the man-land relation. It is true, by regulating the relation of
individuals to society rather than the individual to the land, these laws function in
a different ethical dimension than would a true “land ethic.” But as society comes
to view protecting the environment as a significant societal goal, the substitution
of legal duties, although not a perfect proxy for a “land ethic,” may be the legacy
of the second stage of environmental policy toward agriculture.
The purpose of the “land ethic” is to obligate individuals to be responsible stewards
of the land and prevent land degradation. Hamilton does not analyze the success of
Iowa’s laws in preventing land degradation. However, Eswaran argues that few jurisdic-
tions in the world are successful in preventing land degradation. In addition, there is
considerable disagreement about definition of land degradation, and about how it
should be assessed and measured (Eswaran et al. 2001).
The scope of a duty of stewardship driven by the considerations of environmental
ethics will vary depending on the focus of the ethic. Under a human-centred envi-
ronmental ethic, organisms other than humans are valued only according to their
effect on humans. A humancentric focus in turn narrows the scope of the duty of
stewardship wherein the obligation to prevent environmental degradation extends as
far as harms that negatively impact humans. Under a nature-centered environmental
ethic, all organisms are morally relevant. Consequentially, the scope of the steward-
ship duty would be broader because actors would be obligated to avoid negatively
impacting any nature.
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Examining the application of the meta-principle of sustainability to agricultural prac-
tices also helps to shed light on the relevance of applying the duty of stewardship to
fisheries. Practitioners debate the definition of “sustainability,” but at its simplest it can
be described as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs (National Academy of Sciences 2010). In
the context of agriculture, Hamilton (1998) provides the following highly informative
definition:
Sustainable agriculture is defined in various ways, but in its simplest form, it means
developing agricultural practices which protect the environment while preserving
the economic profitability of farmers. The basis of the concept is that no agricultural
system can be successful in either the short or long term unless it is designed to
sustain the resources necessary for its operation. These resources include both
physical resources of soil, air, and water, and also human and social resources of
farm families, rural communities, and the economic structurenecessary for an
agrarian system to function.
In other words, sustainable practices provide for current use of natural resources
which is not at odds with the future health and viability of those natural resources.
Iowa law defines “sustainable agriculture” as actions “preserving the high productivity
and quality of Iowa’s land” (Iowa Code 1997). Under Iowa law, agriculturists are re-
quired to care for the land so that it remains productive for someone else’s use in the
future (Iowa Code 1997). This legal requirement can be equated to the type of duty of
stewardship advocated to be applied to fisheries – it is an obligation to preserve a nat-
ural resource, may it be land or a fishery, in good enough condition that a future user
can enjoy the same quality of resource.
Fisheries are similar to, but not the same as land and agriculture. In the case of fish-
eries, the general public owns the resource, not the fishers. Even when fishers own
quotas, that quota represents a beneficial right to catch a certain quantity of fish not a
specific quantity of uncaught fish in the ocean that they own. Sustainable fishing is fish-
ing in a manner that maintains and protects the ecosystems and populations needed to
sustain the fishery. Because fishers do not own the fish or the ecosystem in which the
fish live, the obligation to be stewards and the benefits derived from being good stew-
ards are not necessarily self-apparent. However, in order to maintain livelihoods and
food sources that have been depended on for decades, perhaps even centuries, the
responsibility to preserve the fisheries becomes more obvious.Meta-principle: food security
Another important meta-principle and justification for expecting/requiring fishers to
be stewards is food security (Bavinck and Chuenpagdee 2005). Food security is
sometimes regarded simply as a matter of quantity, but this is insufficient. The
World Bank defines food security as “access by all people at all times to enough
food for an active healthy life” World Bank (1996). Thus, achieving food security re-
quires ensuring that an adequate food supply is physically and economically available
to everyone, especially in regions that cannot produce enough food because of
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(Chuenpagdee et al. 2005). Not surprisingly, small-scale fisheries have been recog-
nized as playing a vital role in improving food security in many countries (Kooiman
and Jentoft 2005).
A duty of stewardship will protect small-scale fisheries and their ability to serve as a
livelihood for many and food for others. Small-scale fisheries are the fishers most at risk
of unsustainable fishing and illegal fishing. Obligating all fishers to be stewards of the
fishery and surrounding ecosystem will benefit everyone, the fisheries and the commu-
nities who depend on fishing for a livelihood and source of food.The precautionary principle
The duty of stewardship is essentially a call to not act without knowing the conse-
quences. The precautionary principle states that one should not undertake an activity
for which there is no evidence of its safety. Specifically, within the environmental con-
text, the principle states that when ecological or health risks are suspects, those risks
should be reduced and less-risky alternatives should be pursued where possible (Myers
and Raffensperger 2006). Even in the face of inconclusive science, precautions should
be taken. Furthermore, before engaging in activities that could potentially harm the en-
vironment, the risks should be researched. As good stewards, the mere possibility that
an activity could cause irreparable harm would be sufficient to prevent further actions.
Kooiman recommended that the precautionary principle be applied to fisheries gov-
ernance in the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO 1995). According to
the FAO: “[m]anagement according to the precautionary approach exercises prudent
foresight to avoid unacceptable or undesirable situations, taking into account that
changes in fisheries systems are only slowly reversible, difficult to control, not well
understood, and subject to change in the environment and human values” (Kooiman
et al. 2005). It is hard to say how the actions of today will affect the viability of the fish-
eries in the future. Consequently, it is in the best interests of fishers to investigate any
potential risks from activities before engaging in them. The benefit of requiring the ap-
plication of the duty of stewardship via legislation or individual fishing contracts is that
if a steward has any question about the safety of his/her fishing practices and harms re-
sult as a result of his/her fishing, he/she would be responsible.Meta-principles: responsiveness, respect and inclusiveness
Kooiman also proposes applying the principles of responsiveness, respect and inclusive-
ness to fisheries governance (Kooiman et al. 2005; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). All
fishery stakeholders should be provided the opportunity to be heard and have their
interests protected. They should be actively engaged in the creation and implementa-
tion of a fisheries governance structure, which should be structured in such a way to
respond to concerns. By including all the stakeholders in the governance structure, you
are more likely to get engaged stakeholders who understand and comply with the rules.
Furthermore, the group can take advantage of the myriad of expertise available to them
via the participation of such a wide group of stakeholders. Many stakeholders already
regard themselves as stewards and their leadership within these governance structures
can help to educate others.
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The Public Trust Doctrine states that the government holds certain natural resources,
such as navigable waters, in trust for use by the public. Brewer and Libecap (2007)
explain the public trust doctrine in greater detail:
To insure group values are respected, the rights of the public are vested in the state
as trustee of the resource. As such, the state through its administrative agencies has
a duty to administer, protect, manage and conserve the resource. Any existing
private users have only usufruct rights that can be withdrawn whenever the state
deems that they are inconsistent with the public trust. Because there are no private
property rights, there is no basis for takings challenges in such reallocations.
Furthermore, the legislature cannot alienate trust resources, which must remain with
the state.
Under this doctrine, the State is the steward for resources on behalf of the public. In
addition, the doctrine holds that the public’s ownership of the resource cannot be alien-
ated, and so the resource cannot become private property. If the government were to
deny access by the public to these resources held in trust, a “takings challenge” could
be initiated against the government (Hamilton 2010).
A large shortcoming of this doctrine is that while the government has self-designated
as the “steward” of such resources, the only actions they are required to take are those
that are explicitly prescribed by law. Otherwise, the government is not obligated to act
to steward the resources. Therefore, a government cannot be sued unless a statute re-
quires the government to do something, and the government fails to do it. In short,
even though the doctrine places the state in a stewardship role, it does not impose a
general requirement that the government behave responsibly.
Usufructuary obligations
Usufructuary obligations are similar to that of a steward's as described here. A usufruct
has the right to enjoy the property and the fruit of that property (i.e. the profits that
can be derived from the property such as crops), but does not own full rights to the
property. However, the usufruct can lose their right to the property if their actions des-
troy the property. According to LeVan (1962), under Anglo-American common law, a
legal life tenant “may not change the premises in such a way that remaindermen or re-
versioners would have “reasonable ground for objection thereto”. In Japan, fisheries are
managed by Fishery Cooperative Associations (“FCAs”), organizations made up of local
fishers (Lim 199–200). The FCAs are responsible for designing the rules their members
follow and coordinating with the government which sets allocation limits (McIlwain
2013). A usufruct prescribes essentially the same obligations as the duty of stewardship.
A usufruct is allowed to utilize the resources available to them on the property; how-
ever, they cannot reduce the value or quality of the property or natural resources on
the property.
Introducing stewardship in fisheries
Assigning ITQs is just part of properly managing fisheries. ITQs must be supplemented
with the application of a duty of stewardship in order to ensure that fishers are required
Soliman Maritime Studies 2014, 13:11 Page 11 of 16
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/11to sustainably fish. Fishers can be motivated to become stewards through legal require-
ments, contractual requirements or consumer expectations. And for any of these struc-
tures to work it is imperative those being managed, the regulators as well as the
consumers must understand what is required to be a “steward.”
Small-scale fisheries in developed countries are recognizing the importance of differ-
entiating their products through sustainability. But to achieve this distinction requires
an underlying and fundamental attitude change: these fishers must be able to present
themselves as stewards of the sea. In order to benefit from this distinction fishers have
developed various marketing schemes such as Consumer Supported Fisheries (CSFs)
and Sustainability Labeling Schemes that highlight the use of sustainable fishing
methods and the compliance with any fishing regulations in place. These schemes use
tools such as eco, sustainable, and wild labeling, and traceability techniques to connect
consumers with fishers (Kooiman and Jentoft 2005). Such marketing will entice con-
sumers to buy only sustainably caught fish and fish-products, thereby pressuring other
fishers to become stewards.
The effective use of market-based incentives such as special labels or preferred pur-
chasing agreements requires both a voluntary adoption of the duty of stewardship and
an educated consumer. First, consumers must understand how important it is that fish-
ers are stewards. They must be educated as to the import of fishing sustainably and
complying withlimits on the stocks and areas in which they can fish. If consumers
understand this, they will be more inclined to purchase products to be fished sustain-
ably. Second, fishers must benefit from the voluntary adoption of stewardship practices.
In other words, fishers must reap benefits from being distinguished from fishers who
do not fish sustainably or act as stewards. While market-based incentives may be effect-
ive, the circumstances call for a more immediate shift in practices. Legislation must be
promulgated that requires fishers to be stewards, or contracts must be revised/written
anew to include provisions requiring stewardship by license holders. There are many
fishers who currently, without regulation, act as stewards.
Unfortunately the vast majority of fishers may fish within the limits of their ITQs,
but not act as stewards. Being subject to a duty of stewardship would mean that a fisher
who uses or consumes a fish stock in a way that destroys that stock or its habitat could
be held liable for the damage he/she caused. Explicitly associating a duty to conserve
the stock with holding a quota or licence would allow the possibility of legal action by
a third party against a resource user who neglects this duty – not only against the regu-
lator, as in the example in the preceding section. If enforced, fishers would be moti-
vated to act as responsible resources managers.
ITQs have presented one of the largest challenges to promoting stewardship because
ITQs can be leased, which has been show to weaken the incentives:
According to some fishery managers and experts, leasing reduces stewardship
incentives, which may impact the community's long-term economic viability.
Quota leasing separates the person holding the quota from the person fishing the
quota. In some cases, quota leasing may diminish stewardship incentives by creating
a class of absentee quota holders who rely on independent fishermen. While
owner-on-board rules, such as those in Alaska, may minimize the risk of creating
this class of absentee quota holders, fishermen who lease quota have only a
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the fishery, especially as the end of their lease term approaches. Consequently, incentives
may exist to catch more fish than their quota allows and sell this over-quota fish
on the black market or to fish using nonsustainable methods. For example, according
to New Zealand fishery experts, quota holders in the high-value abalone fishery
found that unskilled fishermen who leased quota were jeopardizing the fish by
extracting them in ways that harmed the abalone beds. (Government Accountability
Office 2004)
When ITQs are leased, the lessee is less likely to have any feeling of obligation to do
more than take advantage of their current license to fish. But the lessor has an incen-
tive to ensure that the lessee does in fact act as a good steward. Similar concerns about
the lack of an incentive for leaseholders to conserve a resource arise in agriculture. To
combat that, many farm lease agreements include a “good husbandry provision”, which
act to impose a stewardship obligation upon the leaseholder. Retired landowners in
Iowa are increasingly choosing to impose such a duty in farmland leases (Cox 2011a).
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that “the purpose of a good husbandry provision is
mandating the proper use of land rather than requiring high yields”, a finding that
clearly creates an obligation to act as a good steward of the owner’s land (Cox 2011b).
If the duty of stewardship was acknowledged as an obligation on all fishers, including
the lessees of ITQs, the lessor would be abled to hold the lessee accountable for any
damages caused (Hamilton 2010). Where fishers use destructive practices in instances
where they could use lessdestructive fishing gear or methods, lessor could get damages.
It is in the lessor’s interest to safeguard the future stream of benefits, while the lessee is
exposed to strong incentives to maximize his current benefits (Munro et al. 2009). The
duty of stewardship allows the lessor to do so even in the absence of strong enforce-
ment. It might be necessary to state some of the practices that are unacceptable to the
lessor, but it would be impossible to include an exhaustive list of everything that is and
is not acceptable. Therefore, it will probably be necessary to definethe duty of steward-
ship in such a way that allows for unforeseen situations in addition to examples of
known unacceptable practices. The benefit is that although the duty would cover a wide
range of situations, the inclusion of examples would guide the courts and reduce the
risk that a court might find the clause to be too vague to be enforced.
A stewardship clause in a quota lease agreement could resemble the following: “It is
the duty of the lessee to exercise good stewardship with respect to the fish stock and
the environment in which the fish stock lives. Good stewardship is defined as neither
fishing, nor conducting other activities in the marine environment, in a manner which
will or is likely to significantly degrade the fish stock or its environment, according to
experience and/or scientific knowledge that is reasonably available to fishermen,
UNLESS no reasonably feasible alternative manner of operation exists.” There has been
significant research on the proper methods of fishing.
Therefore, this research would serve as the basis for determining what practices
and actions do and do not qualify as good proper stewardship. For example, if a lessee
was found to utilize bottom trawling which has been found to destroy coral reefs and
take in bycatch, the lessee would be found liable for failing to fulfill his duty of
stewardship.
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used. For example, in order to be able to renew a fishing license the license holder
would have to demonstrate adequate stewardship. If a fisher has not been found in
breach of this duty, his/her license or quota could be renewed; otherwise it could be re-
voked. This would also mean that if the ITQ holder leases the quota to another fisher
and that fisher fails to comply, the license holder could lose the license. This in essence
disincentivizes the licensing of ITQs (which has other negative impacts on fishing, in-
cluding pushing out small-scale fisheries) and makes the licensor accountable for prop-
erly vetting and monitoring the actions of the licensee. One of the benefits is that
regulators would not have to dismantle the entire scheme to punish one person. In-
stead, the regulator would have the authority to cancel a specific fisher’s quotas without
affecting the system as a whole.
Ideally countries will implement a legislative duty of stewardship. However, if neither
statutory law or a contract explicitly defines a duty of stewardship, the courts may be
asked to find whether an implied duty of stewardship exists under common law. Differ-
ent jurisdictions may answer this question differently, unless a higher court with a
broader jurisdiction has made a decision. It is then up to practitioners to ask a court
whether a duty exists, and whether a party has breached their duty. This is what hap-
pened in Heiderscheit, where Iowa’s appeal court found an implied covenant of good
husbandry (Heiderscheit 1986).
The legislature should impose a statutory duty of stewardship by codifying the duty
into fisheries acts, using wording resembling that proposed above for a lease
agreement.What outcomes could Be expected?
One of the limitations of systems such as ITQs is that if one or a few fishers damage
the resource, the impact is nevertheless absorbed by all quota holders. This may hap-
pen, for example, when a TAC must be lowered because of significant overfishing. In
short, the “stick” is used against all. In principle, the recognition of a duty of steward-
ship would make it possible to penalize the specific culprit. This would encourage mu-
tual self-monitoring among the users.
In jurisdictions such as the United States, a duty of stewardship may also have the
benefit of replacing the unpredictability and theoretically unlimited scope of tort law-
suits with litigation based on the more specific and limited grounds that are specified
by the legislation or precedents defining the fishers’ duty of stewardship. A recent law-
suit against the US government for its alleged failure to control bycatch illustrates the
problem; it is highly unlikely that the tour boat operator who launched the lawsuit is
suffering more than a small fraction of whatever ecological harm has occurred, and it is
certainly true that those whose actions could directly cause the problem would not be
sued at all (The Boat Company 2012). A properly defined duty of stewardship would
enable actions to be brought on the more relevant grounds of ecosystem and fishery
damage, and would enable them to be brought against those who actually caused the
damage.
A duty of stewardship will increase inclusiveness in fisheries governance. In catch
share schemes, the government authorizes users (quota holders) to use the resource.
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servation groups and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often
excluded, and can only affect the current system by way of public awareness and other
activities outside the management scheme. The public is excluded as well; the govern-
ment as trustee acts on behalf of the public. Acknowledging the public as a stakeholder
will increase accountability by acknowledging thatmore people than just the license
holders are affected by the use of unsustainable fishing practices and empowers them
to take action.
A duty of stewardship changes the relationship between quota holders and other
stakeholders. For example, conservationists, small-scale fishers or NGOs could hold
large-scale operators using destructive practices, such as trawlers, accountable. They
could sue them for breaching their duty to use least destructive fishing practices. This
in turn would allow stakeholders to take an active role in a framework that includes
those who were previously unable to participate directly.
In this way, using a duty of stewardship appropriately could change the relationship
between government and other stakeholders towards a more inclusive and balanced
model. In contemporary fishery management, there is a strong call for self-governance
and co-governance, as well as for community-based approaches. The duty of steward-
ship has the potential to bring the stakeholders into a new form of relationship where
the government could itself be held accountable. In other words, the duty of steward-
ship may level the playing field. Furthermore, to the extent that the duty is shared, it
could align the resource users and managers, including the government, so that they
are more likely to cooperate in order to act in an ecologically sound manner.Conclusion
As the world’s human population grows, traditional “open access” capture fisheries have
increasingly often collapsed. The “tragedy of the commons” scenario appears to model
these fisheries quite well. Governments and regulators have implemented many types
of controls in an effort to preserve fisheries. In recent years, ITQs have become a popu-
lar solution, partly because it is believed that they provide an incentive to conserve.
However, ITQs have been found to concentrate ownership of ITQs in the hands of
large-scale fishers and to do little to incentivize conservation.
This paper proposes that supplementing the ITQ regime with a duty of stewardship
would require the necessary conservation and preservation needed in order to ad-
equately protect fisheries for current and future use. The duty of stewardship concept
originated in the agricultural context, and is well-suited to resolve unsustainable fishing
practices. The duty of stewardship could be applied to fishers and regulators through
legislation or contractual provisions. The duty of stewardship is also compatible with
many important meta-governance principles proposed to be applied to fisheries. Apply
an explicit duty of stewardship to fisheries will result in accountable regulators and
fishers, will include all the affected stakeholders in the development and implementa-
tion the duty as well as the management of the fishery, and result in better fish and
ecosystem conservation.Competing interests
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